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Abstract: The current boom in IoT is changing daily life in many ways, from wearable devices to connected vehicles and smart 
cities. We used to regard fog computing as an extension of cloud computing, but it is now becoming an ideal solution for trans-
mitting and processing large-scale geo-distributed big data. In this paper, we propose a Byzantine fault tolerant networking method 
and two resource allocation strategies for IoT fog computing. Our aim is to build a secure fog network called SIoTFog to resist 
Byzantine faults and improve the efficiency of transmitting and processing IoT big data. We consider two cases: a case with a 
single Byzantine fault and a case with multiple faults to compare their performances when facing different degrees of risk. We 
chose latency, forwarding hops in the transmission and device use rate as the metrics for analysis of the simulation results. The 
simulation results show that our strategies can help achieve an efficient and reliable fog network. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Recent years have witnessed the boom in the 
Internet of Things and the hypergrowth of cloud 
computing which again overturned our perception of 
information technology. By 2020 there will be more 
than 20 billion IoT devices manufactured and put into 
use after increases of 15 percent occurring 
year-after-year (IHS Markit report, 2017). Originally, 
as an extension of cloud computing, fog computing 
relied on collaborative end-user clients or near-user 
edge devices to provide a substantial amount of 
storage capacity and communication solutions. Now, 
the fog has already become a research hotspot which 
not only broadens our perspective in distributed 
computation but also provides brand new ideas to 
exploit the potential of "Things" besides the "Inter-
net." 
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) describes the 
dependability of fault-tolerant computing systems, 
especially distributed ones. The Byzantine Generals’ 
Problem or the BFT Problem was first raised by 
Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak and Marshall Pease 
early in 1982 (Lamport et al., 1982). In BFT, a group 
of generals are trying to reach an agreement to decide 
whether to attack or retreat according to their votes in 
the majority. Considering the appearances of mes-
sengers or the presence of traitors who want to disrupt 
the whole group, the final agreement may run in a 
direction opposite of the original intentions of all 
loyal generals. A Byzantine fault stands for the in-
consistency whereby generals receive different mes-
sages from a single general, and Byzantine failure is 
the system malfunction caused by Byzantine fault. 
The occurrence of Byzantine faults can be very 
common in distributed systems such as fog networks. 
Sometimes fog nodes may fail and there is imperfect 
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information about whether a particular node has 
failed. The only way to completely solve this problem 
is to find the failed node. However, we cannot ask a 
running distributed system to stop and troubleshoot 
all nodes. Instead, a relative compromise is a solution 
that designs a fault tolerance mechanism. That is, 
what we prefer to do is to cope with BFT while in-
troducing as little impact as possible to the network 
computing performance. 
In this paper, we focus on the issue of Byzantine 
fault tolerance in resource allocation of fog compu-
ting for IoT applications. The property of fault toler-
ance enables a system to continue working properly 
when some of its components go down. Therefore, 
good fault-tolerance performance can greatly avoid 
the interruption of retransmissions in network com-
munications and reduce extra energy consumption 
and time costs. 
In fog computing, the role of large central serv-
ers is carried out by a massive number of 
geo-distributed small- and medium-sized fog devices 
at the edge of the network structure. Thus, rather than 
setting dedicated standby replicas for all fog devices, 
we can simply let the fog devices help each other for 
state machine replication. Thus, a fog device can 
serve as the replica of its neighbor to reduce the in-
fluence of a possible Byzantine fault. Taking into 
account the mobility of IoT devices, the relationship 
between replicas and primary devices can also change 
while the entire network is running. As a result, we 
need a dynamic resource allocation strategy to solve 
BFT in fog computing. The main contributions of our 
work are as follows. 
• A 3-tiered heterogeneous fog network model is 
designed in which the routers as fog devices are 
providing services to IoT users such as sensors, smart 
devices and vehicles. 
• A Byzantine-resilient fog networking method 
and two resource allocation strategies are proposed to 
help reduce the influence of Byzantine faults. 
• The case of a single Byzantine fault and the 
case of multiple faults are considered to test the per-
formance of the strategies when facing different de-
grees of risk. 
• Total latency, forwarding hops in the trans-
mission and the device use rate are chosen as the 
metrics for analysis of the simulation results. 
This paper is divided into six sections to elabo-
rate on our work on Byzantine fault tolerant resource 
allocation for an IoT fog network. Section 2 intro-
duces related work in the fields of fog computing and 
the Byzantine fault tolerance problem. Section 3 
formulates the mathematical model of a 3-tiered het-
erogeneous IoT fog network structure and describes 
the problems to solve. Section 4 proposes the resource 
allocation methods. Section 5 describes the simula-
tion experiments carried out and analyzes the per-
formance of the proposed methods. Section 6 sum-
marizes the work. 
 
2  Related work 
 
In this section, we present the related work on 
fog computing and the Byzantine fault tolerance 
problem. 
2.1  From the cloud to the fog 
First put forward by Cisco Systems Inc. (Bonomi 
et al., 2012), fog computing serves as an extension of 
cloud computing as a way to share responsibility for 
data storage and processing at the edge of the network 
structure. Vaquero et al. from the Hewlett-Packard 
Company (HP) offered a comprehensive view of fog 
computing, and correlated it with existing technolo-
gies such as the cloud, sensor networks, peer-to-peer 
networks and the network virtualization function 
(NFV) to reach a definition of "the fog" (Vaquero and 
Rodero-Merino, 2014). The group led by Satyana-
rayanan et al. conducted research for years into mo-
bility-enhanced small-scale instances of cloud data-
centers, the cloudlet, to mobile edge computing 
(MEC) in IoT (Satyanarayanan et al., 2009; Satya-
narayanan, 2017). Liu et al. focused on streaming 
media in heterogeneous edge networks and proposed 
a device-to-device relay-assisted scheme to help solve 
video frame recovery for picocell edge users (Liu et 
al., 2016). Tao et al. integrated fog and cloud compu-
ting to build a hybrid network model for Vehi-
cle-to-Grid (V2G) and 5G services (Tao et al., 2017a). 
Stojmenovic et al. analyzed the real-world application 
scenarios of the fog such as in smart grids, smart 
traffic and software defined networks (SDN). In these 
scenarios, the man-in-the-middle attack is regarded as 
a typical security issue to represent new features in 
the fog (Stojmenovic and Wen, 2014a). Yi et al. fo-
cused on the new security and privacy challenges 
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besides those inherited from the cloud and proposed 
ideas for solutions (Yi et al., 2015). Alrawais et al. 
considered the fog and IoT as a whole and put forward 
a mechanism to improve the distribution of certificate 
revocation information for security enhancement 
among IoT devices in the fog (Alrawais et al., 2017). 
Li et al. propose the idea of introducing deep learning 
to solve problems in edge computing (Li et al., 2018). 
Hu et al. addressed face identification and resolution 
technology, and implemented a prototype system to 
evaluate their proposed security and privacy preser-
vation method (Hu et al., 2017). 
Compared with cloud computing, fog computing 
was originally intended to share the high load of a 
central architecture and help save on the extra cost 
that occurs between cloud servers and IoT devices at 
the edge of a network. Jalali et al. believed that fog 
computing could just help to reduce the energy con-
sumption in cloud computing (Jalali et al., 2016). Tao 
et al. investigated the problem of energy efficiency in 
mobile-edge computing and applied a request of-
floading scheme to improve the performance of en-
ergy consumption and bandwidth capacity (Tao et al., 
2017b). Perera et al. surveyed the existed research and 
the problems to solve in fog computing for sustaina-
ble smart cities (Perera et al., 2017). Castillo-Cara et 
al. put forward a fog node design to solve the energy 
consumption problem and network resilience provi-
sioning in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) (Cas-
tillo-Cara et al., 2018). Zeng et al. study how to ex-
plore energy generation diversity in a cyber physical 
fog system (CPFS) considering source rate control, 
service replica deployment and load balancing (Zeng 
et al., 2018). Wu et al. combine information-centric 
networks (ICNs) in designing content awareness fil-
tering to help increase the safety factor of fog com-
puting (Wu et al., 2018b). 
2.2  Research on the Byzantine fault tolerance 
problem 
Fault tolerance refers to the property where no 
global errors or interruptions occur in a system due to 
local faults. As a result, fault-tolerant design is very 
common and important in research fields related to an 
overall system structure (Khosravi and Seifi Kavian, 
2016; Gao et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2018). Since the 
idea was first raised by Lamport et al. (1982), re-
search into Byzantine fault tolerance has undergone 
decades of development. Castro et al. first explored in 
depth the practice of BFT and implemented a generic 
program library and the first BFT network file system 
(NFS). Their experiment results showed that a NFS 
with BFT, i.e., a BFS, performs better than the NFS 
protocol without replicas (Castro and Liskov, 2002). 
Driscoll et al. redefined the concepts in Byzantine 
problems including the widely known existence of 
Byzantine faults and their possibility of leading to 
Byzantine failures. Their work points out some mis-
understandings about the conditions needed for the 
appearance of a Byzantine attack as well as prevent-
ing those mechanism (Driscoll et al., 2003, 2004). 
Kotla et al. propose a speculative BFT protocol, the 
Zyzzyva, to simplify the design of BFT state machine 
replication and ensure that responses to the correct 
clients become stable. They compare this with exist-
ing BFT protocols including (Castro and Liskov, 2002) 
in cost, throughput and latency, and proved that 
Zyzzyva can maintain properties of safety and 
liveness (Kotla et al., 2010). 
Today BFT is now widely accepted as a basic 
security necessity especially for distributed systems 
with system-level consensus requirements and mutual 
clock synchronization (Driscoll et al., 2004). Aublin 
et al. designed a Redundant-BFT (RBFT) approach to 
closely monitor the performance of instances from the 
primary to replicas on different machines (Aublin et 
al., 2013). Bessani et al. improved the previous BFT 
protocols by applying an open Java-based library 
source to make the state machine replication robust 
(Bessani et al., 2014). Li et al. designed a secure 
software-defined network (SDN) structure to resist 
Byzantine attacks on the communication links be-
tween SDN controllers and switches (Li et al., 2014). 
Wu et al. present optimization algorithms to achieve 
secure cluster management in SDNs (Wu et al., 
2018a). Zhang et al. focused on the case of a cognitive 
radio network (CRN) and introduced the Byzantine 
attack and defense in cooperative spectrum sensing 
which is one of the key security issues in a CRN 
(Zhang et al., 2015). Miller et al. argued that the 
former synchronous BFT protocols relied critically on 
network time assumptions and came up with the idea 
of an asynchronous one to extend the adaptability to 
asynchronous systems such as blockchain technology 
(Miller et al., 2016). 
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3  Problem formulation 
 
In this section, we design the system model and 
formulate the problem of BFT in fog computing. 
In contrast to a traditional centralized network 
design, fog computing prioritizes local distributed 
devices at the edge of the network to provide 
low-latency resource-constrained processing and 
storage services. In the fog, there can exist more 
complex relations between users and the fog devices 
as service providers. That is, each user may not stay in 
contact with the same service provider all the time. 
Rather than a dedicated wide bandwidth, fog users 
prefer flexible dynamic resource allocation which 
may save extra time and energy consumption in mul-
ti-hop forwarding. 
To resist the influence of Byzantine faults, we 
need to set replicas for network nodes as backups to 
restore and recover data when necessary. In the case 
of the fog, we may not need to prepare dedicated 
devices for Byzantine fault tolerance and may just be 
able to assign neighbor fog devices to serve as repli-
cas. 
 
3f + 1n                               (1) 
 
As shown in Equation (1), existing BFT proto-
cols including PBFT (Castro and Liskov, 2002), 
Zyzzyva (Kotla et al., 2010) and Honey Badger BFT 
(Miller et al., 2016) elaborate on how we need at least 
3f extra devices as replicas to tolerate f Byzantine 
faults while all communications are synchronous or in 
bounded delays. For example, if the number of Byz-
antine faults reaches 3, we may need at least 10 fog 
nodes to avoid Byzantine failure. 








Fig. 1  A 3-tiered heterogeneous IoT fog network structure. 
Shown in Fig. 1, we formulate the mathematical 
model of a 3-tiered heterogeneous IoT fog network 
structure (Stojmenovic and Wen, 2014a) (Reznik et 
al., 2017). Our aim is to reduce the impact of Byzan-
tine faults in resource allocation for fog computing. 
As a result, we consider that this three-tiered model 
can more intuitively show the relationship between 
the fog nodes as service providers and the users as 
service receivers than models with more tiers. 
User nodes (u1, u2, …, un) in the User Tier send 
requests upwards to ask the routers as fog nodes (f1, 
f2, …, fn) in the Fog Tier for computational resources 
through access points. The Cloud Tier serves as reli-
able data centers providing stable network connec-
tions. The solid and dotted lines, respectively, stand 
for Ethernet and wireless connections. That is, 
communications between the User Tier and Fog Tier 
are wireless broadcasting, those inside the Fog Tier 
are wired broadcasting, and those between the Fog 











Fig. 2  BFT threat model in the fog service. 
Figure 2 shows the threat model in our work. 
When users choose some fog nodes as service pro-
viders, they also need to accept some permissions for 
authority. The situation is similar to a pop-up window 
that appears before installation or the first time one 
opens an app on a smart device; for example, when 
the user in the figure chooses f1 to finish a task on a 
mobile phone. For account certification, a user allows 
f1 to use the camera when a service is provided. In 
normal cases, f1 will send a message to let the user 
turn off the camera after certification. However, when 
f1 is controlled by someone who wants to obtain ad-
ditional personal privacy information, the message 
may be modified to remain open. To guarantee the 
operation of the fog network, we cannot interrupt 
service extensively to troubleshoot some individual 
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malicious nodes. It is better to draw support from a 
suitable fault tolerant strategy to avoid possible sys-
tem failures. 
To implement Byzantine fault tolerance in this 
3-tiered fog network, we need geo-distributed routers 
to work as fog nodes to help each other when facing 
Byzantine faults. After choosing f1 as a service pro-
vider, we also set replicas (f2, f3 and f4) to ensure state 
machine replication when necessary. Here, we con-
sider the case of a single Byzantine fault in which 
three replicas are required by one primary fog node. 
The  entire procedure of Byzantine-resilient commu-
nication in the design of our fog network is as follows. 
• i. A mobile user in the User Tier requests 
computational resources from the Fog Tier. 
• ii. A fog node in the Fog Tier within a suitable 
distance to the user accepts the request and then for-
wards it to the other 3f fog nodes as replicas. 
• iii. Both the primary and the replicas execute 
the task and send back responses to the original user. 
As a result, the original user can then check the 
responses that even if f1 wants to keep the camera on, 
he/she is still able to avoid a Byzantine failure from 
the single fault by checking responses from f2 to f4. 
3.2  Performance metrics 
To compare the actual performances of our 
proposed BFT resource allocation strategy, we choose 
total latency and forwarding hops in the transmission 
as the two main metrics to evaluate the performance 
of our work. 
To achieve Byzantine fault tolerance and avoid 
Byzantine failures, our strategies operate at the ex-
pense of reducing some computing performance in 
the fog network. That is, in the process of multiple fog 
nodes working together to complete a user request, an 
additional information exchange is implemented to 
eliminate the possible impact of the failed nodes. 
Latency is a basic metric widely used in performance 
evaluation in engineering. Here we use it to prove that 
our strategies can achieve BFT with as little time cost 
as possible. 
 
all trans prop procL L L L    
  2/ /
pktn
hop pkt bit e e prop
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s i r   
 
As shown in Equation (2), the total end-to-end 
latency Lall mainly includes three parts, the latencies 
of transmission, propagation and processing proce-
dures. Transmission latency Ltrans represents the 
amount of time for pushing all bits of packets into the 
transmission medium like the wires or air. Ltrans has 
nothing to do with the distance between any two 
nodes and only relates to the total size of the packets. 
npkt and spkt are the number and size of the packets. rbit 
is the bandwidth or bit rate of the transmission link. In 
contrast, propagation latency Lprop depends on the 
travel distance between the sender and receiver and 
the property of the transmission medium. For wireless 
communication, vprop is equal to the speed of light c, 
and for wired communication, it ranges from 0.59c to 
0.77c. Thus, le2e may stand for the end-to-end length 
added up by all distances between any two nodes 
taking part in the current communication. Lastly, to 
calculate the processing latency, we need the maxi-
mum transfer rate rMTR of the fog devices and the total 
packet size. 
 
i. i. ii. iii.
all trans prop
userL L L L                   (3) 
 
Then, to obtain the latency in practice, in the 
entire procedure described in Fig. 2, as shown in 
Equation (3), we may need to calculate each part of 
the three steps. For step i., we just sum up the trans-
mission and propagation latencies since there is only 
one connection between the user and primary fog 
node f1. 
 
ii. iii. ii. iii.{ | 1,2,3,4}
ifL max L i            (4) 
 
However, for steps ii and iii, since the replicas 
may differ from each other in their positions from the 
user and primary fog node and processing capacity, 
etc., we need to figure out the practical latency values 
of the primary and each replica, and pick the maxi-
mum one as shown in Equation (4). 
 
2
1, 2 2 2ii. iii. ,
f trans prop trans prop proc
f f f user fL L L L
 
          (5) 
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Lastly, Equation (5) gives the expression of 
summation. We take f2 in Fig. 2 as the example, with 
latencies in steps ii and iii.   includes the two steps for 
Ltrans, Lprop, and Lproc. 
Moreover, we also choose the number of for-
warding hops in the transmission which can reflect 










all hop hop hop
hop user pri f f f user
i
n n n n

         (6) 
 
As shown in Equation (6), in contrast to the total 
latency, to calculate total number of forwarding hops 
in the transmission we need to consider all the con-
nections in the three steps of Fig. 2. 
Besides total latency forwarding hops, to gain a 
thorough understanding of the network structure, we 
add the fog nodes’ use rates and the percentages of 
workload capacity occupied by the primary/replicas 
as two auxiliary metrics to provide more details into 
the analysis of the simulation results. 
The use rate stands for the overall resource oc-
cupancy of all fog nodes. Here, we use it to study the 
actual working conditions of the entire IoT fog net-
work, and the possible changes brought about by 
resource allocation strategies. In the section on sim-
ulation, we consider the cases of both workload ca-
pacities occupied as primary service providers and as 
replicas. Moreover, we treat the two cases separately 
to calculate the percentages. 
Table 1 summarizes and lists the main symbols 
used in this paper. 
Table 1  Notations in the design of the Byzantine-resilient 
fog network 
Symbol Meaning 
U, ui Set of user nodes and one in it 
F, fi Set of fog nodes and one in it 
Ltrans/prop/proc 
Latencies of total, transmission, propa-
gation and processing 
nhop 
Number of forwarding hops in the 
transmission 
npkt, Spkt Number and size of packets 
rbit Bit rate of the transmission link 
le2e 
End-to-end length of the network con-
nection 
vprop 
Wave propagation speed of the transmis-
sion medium 
rMTR Maximum transfer rate of the device 
Ci,j Distance or number of forwarding hops 
between fi and fj 
Pi Position coordinates of fi 
path(Pi, Pj) 
Summation of all connections between fi 
and fj 
wthis 
Needed workload capacity of the current 
request from the user 
Cpri, Crep 
Workload capacities of the fog nodes 
occupied as primary and replicas 
 
4  Byzantine fault tolerant resource sllocation 
strategy 
 
In this section, we propose resource allocation 
strategies for a fog network aimed at resisting the 
influence of Byzantine faults. 
4.1  BFT fog networking 
Before choosing the primary nodes and replicas 
for users in need of fog service, we first build up a 
BFT fog network which considers all neighbor rela-
tionships among the routers as fog nodes. Here our 
target is to fulfill the requirements of the BFT proto-
col called Zyzzyva in (Kotla et al., 2010) (n = 3f + 1). 
Algorithm 1    Breadth-First BFT Fog Networking 
Input:  F = {f1, f2, …, fn} // all n fog nodes in the network 
structure 
              Pi // position coordinates of all the fog nodes 
              fi.adj // the list of all adjacent nodes to fi 
              Qfog, Qsave // FIFO queues to keep fog nodes 
              layer, leaves (layer) // layers and leaves in tree map 
Output:  
,{ | , {1,2,..., }, }i jc i j n i j   //connections between 
any fi and fj 
1    for i ← 2 to n do 
2        for j ← 1 to i – 1 do  
3       Qfog ←  , Qsave ←   
4            if find(fi.adj = j) then 
5                ci.j.nhop ← 1,ci,j.le2e ← path(Pi,Pj) 
6            end if 
7            push all fi.adj into Qfog and Qsave 
8            layer ← 1, leaves (layer) ← sizeof (fi.adj) 
9            while Qfog    do  
10              if leaves(layer) = 0 then 
11                  layer ← layer + 1 
12              end if 
13              this ← Qfog.pop() 
14              leaves(layer) ← leaves(layer) – 1 
15              if find(fthis.adj = j) then 
16                  ci,j.nhop ← layer + 1,ci,j.le2e ← path(Pi, Pj) 
17                  break 
18              end if 
19              drop any fthis.adj already in Qsave and push into 
Qfog and Qsave one by one 
20                leaves(layer) ← leaves(layer) + sizeof(f'this.adj) 
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21           end while 
22       end for 
23   end for 
 
Algorithm 1 is based on a non-recursive 
breadth-first search (BFS) method to implement BFT 
fast networking. To obtain the connection situations 
ci,j between any two fog nodes { f1, f2,…, fn} including 
geographical distances and forwarding hops in rout-
ing, we need the two-dimension positions (Pi) and 
neighbor lists recording all adjacent nodes (fi.adj). 
The two first-in first-out (FIFO) queues Qfog, Qsave 
and the variables layer, leaves are used to build the 
tree maps formulated by the BFS method. Some key 
points are as follows. 
• Qfog is used as the main data structure to take 
the whole situation into account. The cyclic condition 
in line 9 could not be broken unless no existing path is 
found between fi and fj after traversing all other nodes. 
• Qsave is an instrumental variable to save all 
non-repetitive nodes which means no path will be 
tried twice. In line 19 we drop the neighbors of fthis 
which are already covered by Qsave before pushing the 





( , ) ( , )
i jn






 P P P P        (7)  
 
• The path (Pi,Pj) function in lines 5 and 16 
stands for the summation of all connections between 
any two of the nodes in the full path from fi to fj. 
Equation (7) gives the calculation of path() in which 
ni,j represents the number of nodes in the path be-
tween fi and fj. 
• A tree map is obtained through the BFS method 
and we use the layer and leaves(layer) to record the 
current layer and how many nodes are within this 
layer. 
To set the primary fog node and replicas for user 
in a request, we need to ensure the protocol commu-
nications between any two different nodes. That is to 
say, although our fog network is not a real full con-
nected network, we still can make sure that fi can 
exchange messages with fj at any time after limited 
forwarding hops. The time complexity of Algorithm 1 
is O(n2(1 + n)) = O(n3 + n2) = O(n3). 
4.2  BFT resource allocation strategy 
To resist f Byzantine faults in our fog network, 
we set the nearby fog nodes as replicas to help achieve 
state machine replication. Thus, each replica needs to 
repeat what the primary fog node is doing and send 
back the processing result to the user in a request. 
Algorithm 2    OPMD: One Phase Minimum Dis-
tance 
Input:   wthis // workload need by user 
              Cpri,Crep // capacities of fog nodes used as primary and 
replicas 
              cthis,j // connections between user and fog node fj 
              fneed // 3f + 1 fog nodes as primary and replicas 
              Cleft // resource capacity of fog nodes 
Output:  resource allocation results for all users 
1    for i ← 2 to 3f + 1 do 
2        find fj with minimum cthis,j.le2e and set as fneed(i) 
3   if !find(fneed(1 to i - 1) = fneed(i)) && fneed ( i) .Cleft ≥ 
wthis then 
4            if i = 1 then 
5                fneed.Cpri ← fneed.Cpri + wthis 
6            else 
7                fneed.Crep ← fneed.Crep + wthis 
8            end if 
9            fneed.Cleft ← fneed.Cleft - wthis  
10      else 
11          continue 
12      end if 
13   end for 
 
OPMD gives an entire procedure for setting one 
primary fog node and 3f replicas for workload wthis 
requested by the current user. Cpri and Crep, respec-
tively, stand for the resource allocation result where a 
part of the workload capacity is set as the primary or 
replica. We sort all the fog nodes by their distances 
away from the position of the current user and judge if 
the remaining workload capacity Cleft is full as well as 
if no fog node is being requested twice. Some key 
points are as follows. 
• We use the fneed as a set of temporary choices 
of fog nodes during the 3f + 1 cycles and regard the 
first choice as the primary fog node. 
• !find(fneed(1 to i - 1) = fneed(i)) in line 3 is a 
function to make sure that the current chosen fneed(i) is 
not included in the former fneed. 
OPMD focuses on shortening the communica-
tion distances between users and fog nodes, which 
may extensively cut down on the propagation laten-
cies Lprop in Equation (2). The algorithm itself makes 
full use of the advantages of fast networking in the 
BFS method and is able to find all 3f + 1 required fog 
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nodes in a simple and straightforward way. The time 
complexity of Algorithm 2 is O((3f + 1)(n + 1)) = 
O(3fn + 3f + n + 1) = O(fn). 
However, OPMD may also place an extra burden 
on communications among the primary fog nodes and 
replicas providing service for the same users to some 
extent. As a result, we put forward a two-phase algo-
rithm to optimize this issue between the primary fog 
nodes and replicas. 
Algorithm 3    TPSP: Two-Phase Shortest Path 
Input:   wthis // workload need by user 
              Cpri,Crep // capacities of fog nodes used as primary and 
replicas 
              fpri, frep // fog nodes set as primary and replicas 
              cthis,j // connections between user and fog node fj 
              fneed // 3f + 1 fog nodes as primary and replicas 
              Cleft // resource capacity of fog nodes 
Output:  resource allocation results for all users 
1    find fj with minimum cthis,j.le2e && fj.Cleft ≥ wthis and 
set as fpri(i) 
2    fpri.Cpri ← fpri.Cpri + wthis 
3    fpri.Cleft ← fpri.Cleft - wthis 
4    for i ← 1 to 3f do 
5         find fj with least cpri,j.nhop or minimum cpri,j .le2e and 
set as frep(i) 
6        if frep   fpri && !find(frep(1 to i - 1) = frep(i)) && 
frep(i).Cleft ≥ wthis then 
7            frep .Crep ← frep.Crep + wthis 
8            frep .Cleft ← frep.Cleft - wthis 
9      else 
10          continue 
11      end if 
12   end for 
 
Compared to OPMD, TPSP adopts a two-phase 
design which first chooses the optimal fog node as 
primary and lets the primary look for its 3f replicas. 
Thus, after choosing one of the fog nodes as fj, sub-
sequent sorting and other work will be carried out 
around it instead of the current user who requests wthis. 
Some key points are as follows. 
• The sum of fpri and frep is equal to fneed in TPSP. 
• Line 5 shows two selections in choosing suit-
able neighbor fog nodes as replicas which may show 
different performances such as the majority in total 
latency as shown in Equation (2) whereby Ltrans pays 
more attention to the number of forwarding hops and 
Lprop relies on the transmission distance. 
The time complexity of Algorithm 3 is 
O(1+3f(n+ 1)) = O(3fn + 3f + 1) = O(fn). 
 
5  Simulation and analysis 
 
In this section, we carry out experimental simu-
lations to evaluate the performance of the resource 
allocation strategies designed for a BFT fog network 
in two cases: a case of a single Byzantine fault and a 
case of multiple Byzantine faults. The simulation 
scenario is a 10 km2 square open area in which we set 
up 100 routers with access points as fog nodes. There 
are 50 to 500 mobile IoT users requesting fog service 
from nearby fog nodes. 
Table 2  Experimental setups 
Bit rate of transmission 
Wireless (802.11ad) 6.8 Gbit/s 
Ethernet 10 Gbit/s 
Maximum transfer unit (802.11) 2304 Bytes 
Wave propagation speed of transmission 
Wireless (air) c (speed of light) 
Ethernet (thick coax) 0.77 c 
Device settings of the fog nodes 
Maximum transfer rate (SATA3) 750 MB/s 
Workload capacity of fog node 32~512 MB 
As shown in Table 2, we consider the conditions 
of both wireless and Ethernet connections with their 
respective transmission bit rate and wave propagation 
speed. The workload capacity of a single fog node 
would be in one of {32, 64, 128, 256, 512} MB ac-
cording to the case of a single Byzantine fault or of 
multiple faults. We take multiple time-slots for 
sending and answering requests, processing and 
storage. We repeat each set of experiments 10 times 
with different numbers of IoT users. 
5.1  Single Byzantine fault 
First, we consider the condition of a single 
Byzantine fault (f = 1) which means our aim here is to 
resist the influence of a single fault in the procedure of 
answering a request from an IoT user. As a result, we 
need to choose four fog nodes in total for one user in 
each time-slot as the primary device and replicas. The 
workload capacity range set for the fog nodes is {32, 






Fig. 3  Simulation results of a single Byzantine fault: (a) 
total latency and (b) total forwarding hops in the trans-
mission. 
As shown in Fig. 3, we calculate the total laten-
cies and forwarding hops in the transmission of dif-
ferent numbers of users. The blue, red, yellow and 
green broken lines, respectively, stand for OPMD, 
two cases of TPSP and a random method as a contrast. 
In Fig. 3a, all four methods show a linear increase in 
the trend from 50 to 500 IoT users requesting fog 
services from 100 routers. Although the differences 
among the four methods are not large when there are 
only a few users, the gap between the random one and 
the other three appears with the growth in number of 
users. The performance of OPMD is relatively poor in 
the three methods which matches our expectation. 
Compared with TPSP which applies two phases in fog 
node selections, the same treatment for the primary 
fog device and replicas does generate some impact on 
the total latencies. That is, the position of the primary 
fog node is more of an issue in not only receiving the 
request but also distributing it to all replicas. There-
fore, the overlong distance or redundant forwarding 
hops between the primary fog node and replicas may 
cost extra time in data transmission. 
For TPSP, the red and yellow lines represent the 
simulation results of different standards in choosing 
suitable neighbor fog nodes shown in line 5 of Algo-
rithm 3. The yellow line in consideration of the for-
warding hops exceeds the red one in distance in total 
latencies, which may illustrate that the time cost for 
transmission latency Ltrans takes up a larger proportion 
than that of propagation latency Lprop. 
The total forwarding hops is the second metric 
we chose to compare and analyze for the performance 
of the simulation results for BFT resource allocation 
in the 3-tiered heterogeneous IoT fog network. From 
Fig. 3b we can see that the yellow broken line of the 
hop standard in TPSP still holds the lead in practical 
efficiency whereby more transmission hops mean 
extra energy consumption in the transmissions be-
tween IoT users and the fog nodes. In particular, when 
there is a large number of users, the TPSP-hop may 
behave better in solving situations where demand 
exceeds supply. Thus, service capacities could be 
insufficient relative to the user’s needs, and some-
times the user may have to choose a service node with 
a relatively high cost in time and energy consumption. 
5.2  Multiple Byzantine faults 
Because we cannot be sure that only one Byz-
antine fault would occur in the BFT communication 
procedure shown in Fig. 2, the case of multiple 
Byzantine faults also should be taken into account. In 
this part of the simulation, f relates to the size of the 
requested workload capacity which means the possi-
bility of multiple Byzantine faults is proportional to 
how many resources are being allocated to users. To 
fulfill the larger need of available resources in total, 
we also adjusted the workload capacity range set of 






Fig. 4  Simulation results of multiple Byzantine faults: (a) 
total latency and (b) total forwarding hops in the trans-
mission. 
5.3  Device use rate and percentage for the pri-
mary and replicas 
Lastly, to figure out the composition and the 
actual working conditions of the entire IoT fog net-
work, we add the results of the fog nodes’ use rates as 
well as the percentage of workload capacity occupied 
by the primary or replicas as auxiliary metrics to 
provide more detail. 
The six subfigures in Figs. 5 and 6 show the use 
rates and primary and replica percentages of three 
resource allocation methods in cases of single and 
multiple faults. The green broken lines stand for the 
actual occupancy rates calculated from the average of 
10 time slots. The blue and red bars are the average 
values of percentages of workload capacity occupied 
by the replicas and primary. First, in the comparisons 
between two cases of the same method, the occupied 
workload capacity proportions of the replicas all in-
crease when there are more replicas needed as well as 
the times a single fog node is set as replicas in multi-
ple requests. Second, in Fig. 5 the use rates of 
TPSP-hop are always lower than the other two 
methods for the range between 5% to 10% which can 
also be an asset for efficiency. That is, TPSP-hop may 
be able to complete the same amount of work using 
fewer computational resources. Third, compared to 
the second point above, in Fig. 6 the gap between 
TPSP-hop and the other two methods in the device 
use rate is narrowed when more than one Byzantine 
fault occurs in a single BFT communication proce-
dure. 
In summary, from the simulation results in the 
two cases of a single Byzantine fault and multiple 
faults, TPSP with the selection standard of fewer 
transmission hops shows better performance in total 
latency, number of forwarding hops and device use 
rate. As a result, our BFT resource allocation strategy 
does help build a reliable fog network structure to 
resist the influence of a single Byzantine fault or 
multiple faults. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, our SIoTFog focuses on how to 
resist the influence of Byzantine faults and improve 
the  transmission and processing efficiency in fog 
computing for IoT. First, we designed a 3-tiered het-
erogeneous IoT fog network model which was mainly 
made up of routers as fog nodes to provide fog service 
to IoT users. To solve the problem of Byzantine fault 
tolerance in fog services, we proposed a fog net-
working method based on breath-first searching and 
two BFT resource allocation strategies to distribute 
workload capacities of the fog nodes to users upon 
request. We consider the cases of both a single Byz-
antine fault and multiple faults in experimental set-
tings. The simulation results show that our proposed 
strategies can help build an efficient and reliable fog 
network when faced with Byzantine faults. 
In the future, we will focus on further improving 
our approach to deal with the various situations that 
may occur in actual network operations. Two per-
formance bounds in our proposed strategies that are a 
priority to be solved are the following. First, to ensure 
BFT in fog computing, we rely on the mutual assis-
tance of the geographically distributed fog nodes 
themselves, which means there may be significant 
differences in performance for different node distri-
butions. Second, in a distributed network composed 
of large-scale fog nodes, the fact that BFT does in-
crease the relationships among the nodes may lead to 
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